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 Hegel without Lacan:  
on Todd McGowan’s 
Emancipation after Hegel 
 
Clint Burnham  
 
0. A note on method 
If Todd McGowan’s new book on Hegel didn’t exist, we would have to invent it. 
McGowan is the giant of Vermont, the Bernie Sanders of the academy, the Larry 
David of Lacanian theory.  
 In my review I make the following argument: desire is algorithmic, and realized 
in clickbait (clickbait names Hegel’s dialectics). McGowan’s book finds in Hegel a 
philosopher for the “after theory” era, a philosopher who forbids us from remaining 
satisfied with particularisms of the left or the right, a philosopher whose theory of 
contradiction is both universalist and grounded in the singular, a Hegel for whom 
love and duty are the slamdance of emancipation. 
 
1. Getting distracted with Hegel 
In her study of the colonial origins of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, Susan Buck-
Morss asks what happens when we think of Haiti “as an agent in Europe’s 
construction” asking her reader to approach this question “in the form of a rebus, a 
picture puzzle, composed of three images.”1 The first image is a 1787 illustration for 
Voltaire’s Candide by Jean-Michel Moreau le Jeune, depicting a slave “who has been 
mutilated by his master”,2 losing a hand and his leg; the second is a dream of 
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Spinoza’s, of “a certain black and mangy Brazilian… [an] Ethiopian who kept 
appearing with the same vividness again and again”;3 the third is an anecdote of 
Adam Smith’s inveterate snatching at lumps of sugar when at tea. This last anecdote 
Buck-Morss analyzes as a disavowal of Smith’s contradictory knowledge of the 
“enormous profits of the sugar plantations in – particularly in Barbados and Saint-
Domingue – despite the fact that all the work was done by slaves” even as Smith 
“condemned slavery as an intolerable obstacle to human progress.”4 The word 
“disavowal” is from Buck-Morss’ own lexicon, and indeed she draws on Mary 
Bellhouse’s deeply psychoanalytic reading of the Moreau illustration and, a few 
pages later, refers as well to Sibylle Fischer’s Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the 
Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution. Buck-Morss also cops to her own 
“resist[ance]” to that approach, arguing that “something is lost when the theoretical 
apparatus of psychoanalysis is mapped directly onto a political analysis of the 
collective unconscious”,5 and, further, that “[w]e do not need Lacanian theory to 
interpret, as a second rebus, Spinoza’s waking vision in 1664.”6 This may be so, 
although even the repetition with a difference, in Spinoza’s account, of the “Brazilian” 
and the “Ethiopian,” a lexical shift from 17th century colonialism to the Biblical, does 
lend itself to a consideration of how such repetition functions as a way of 
encountering/shielding oneself from trauma.7  
But my purpose in beginning so is to consider, as a frame for this review of 
Todd McGowan’s book, whether it is possible to read Hegel without Lacan today. 
What do I mean by this? In a recent article on “Jameson avec or sans Žižek,” I argued 
that we can only think of theorists or other figures together (the Lacanian avec) if we 
think of them separately (or sans) and, further, that we only think of them sans after 
we think of them avec:  
 
Žižek sans Jameson or Jameson sans Žižek is not simply the appearance of 
each theorist shorn of any reference to the other, but instead what we think of 
their work, or read in their work after reading them together. AND, that 
“together” is not a symmetrical reading, but a non-relation (which is to say, is 
itself dialectical, a dialectical subroutine, let’s put it, part of the grand dialectic 
figured in the quotation from Valences), for … we now have two “togethers,” 
one of which is reading, as I said at the beginning of this paragraph, Jameson 
avec Žižek (to read Jameson in terms of Žižekian theory or reading practices), 
while the other means to read Žižek avec Jameson (to read Žižek via 
Jameson’s interpretive praxis).8 
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My first contention, that reading theorists sans each other means “what we 
think of their work, or read in their work after reading them together,” is well 
illustrated, I think, by Buck-Morss’s text, where she has first to stage a psychoanalytic 
reading of her material and then pull back, as it were, from what turns out to be too 
traumatic, too Lacanian. But this is worth spending a bit more time on, for it will also 
lead into an argument I make in this review that calls for an attention, when reading 
Hegel, to media-specificity, and so it is worth considering what Buck-Morss calls the 
“rebus,” the “picture puzzle, composed of three images”, and specifically, the print-
culture nature of the Moreau illustration she decodes with the help of Bellhouse. 
What is interesting about Buck-Morss’ turn to the illustration is that, on the one hand, 
it is of a piece with her larger argument in Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History, which 
is not simply a call for us to pay attention to the role of Haiti in Hegel’s formulation of 
the master-slave dialectic (although that is, of course, crucial), but also a demand 
that we break down of disciplinary boundaries, between philosophy and history, to 
be sure, as well as, arguably, for the role of media studies in understanding how Haiti 
may have made its way into Hegel. For Hegel, Buck-Morss reminds us, was an 
inveterate reader of newspapers, including the abolitionist Minerva9 (giving a new 
understanding to the phrase “the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the 
coming of dusk”), from Hegel’s university days in Tübingen to the period in which he 
wrote the Phenomenology: 
 
No one has dared to suggest that the idea for the dialectic of lordship and 
bondage came to Hegel in Jena in the years 1803-5 from reading the press--
journals and newspapers. And yet this selfsame Hegel, in this very Jena period 
during with the master-slave dialectic was first conceived, made the following 
notation: ‘Reading the newspaper in early morning is a kind of realistic 
morning prayer. One orients one’s attitude against the world and toward God 
[in one case – SB-M], or toward that which the world is [in the other]. The 
former gives the same security as the latter, in that one knows where one 
stands.’10 
 
So this consideration suggests that Buck-Morss is already rehearsing the 
argument that in order to understand Hegel one should think about media culture, 
about philosophy’s place in that media. 
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2. Clickbait without Lacan 
 One of the through-lines learned from McGowan’s remarkable book, the 
argument that we can best understand Hegelian emancipation by considering when 
we are most on the hook, most trapped, by the “unconscious choice” we make when, 
in the morass of the digital, we “fall for” clickbait, can be arrived at considering a twin 
set of passages from the Phenomenology. These are the paragraphs where Hegel 
describes being “torn asunder,” and, as luck (which is to say, tuchê) will have it, he 
also mentions “the bait required to awaken the desire to bite.” 
 
If we apprehend a demand of this kind in its broader context, and view it as it 
appears at the stage which self-conscious Spirit has presently reached, it is 
clear that Spirit has now got beyond the substantial life it formerly led in the 
element of thought, that it is beyond the immediacy of faith, beyond the 
satisfaction and security of the certainty that consciousness then had, of its 
reconciliation with the essential being, and of that being's universal presence 
both within and without. It has not only gone beyond all this into the other 
extreme of an insubstantial reflection of itself into itself, but beyond that too. 
Spirit has not only lost its essential life; it is also conscious of this loss, and of 
the finitude that is its own content. Turning away from the empty husks, and 
confessing that it lies in wickedness, it reviles itself for so doing, and now 
demands from philosophy, not so much knowledge of what it is, as the 
recovery through its agency of that lost sense of solid and substantial being. 
Philosophy is to meet this need, not by opening up the fast-locked nature of 
substance, and raising this to self-consciousness, not by bringing 
consciousness out of its chaos back to an order based on thought, nor to the 
simplicity of the Notion, but rather by running together what thought has put 
asunder, by suppressing the differentiations of the Notion and restoring the 
feeling of essential being: in short, by providing edification rather than insight. 
The ‘beautiful’, the ‘holy’, the ‘eternal’, ‘religion’, and ‘love’ are the bait required to 
arouse the desire to bite; not the Notion, but ecstasy, not the cold march of 
necessity in the thing itself, but the ferment of enthusiasm, these are supposed 
to be what sustains and continually extends the wealth of substance.11 
 
And slightly later: 
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Analysis of an idea, as it used to be carried out, did in fact consist in nothing 
else than doing away with its character of familiarity. To break up an idea into 
its ultimate elements means returning upon its moments, which at least do not 
have the form of the given idea when found, but are the immediate property of 
the self. Doubtless this analysis only arrives at thoughts which are themselves 
familiar elements, fixed inert determinations. But what is thus separated, and in 
a sense is unreal, is itself an essential moment; for just because the concrete 
fact is self-divided, and turns into unreality, it is something self-moving, self-
active. The action of separating the elements is the exercise of the force of 
Understanding, the most astonishing and greatest of all powers, or rather the 
absolute power. The circle, which is self-enclosed and at rest, and, qua 
substance, holds its own moments, is an immediate relation, the immediate, 
continuous relation of elements with their unity, and hence arouses no sense 
of wonderment. But that an accident as such, when cut loose from its 
containing circumference, – that what is bound and held by something else 
and actual only by being connected with it, – should obtain an existence all its 
own, gain freedom and independence on its own account – this is the 
portentous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of pure ego. 
Death, as we may call that unreality, is the most terrible thing, and to keep and 
hold fast what is dead demands the greatest force of all. Beauty, powerless 
and helpless, hates understanding, because the latter exacts from it what it 
cannot perform. But the life of mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps 
clear of destruction; it endures death and in death maintains its being. It only 
wins to its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder. It is this mighty power, 
not by being a positive which turns away from the negative, as when we say of 
anything it is nothing or it is false, and, being then done with it, pass off to 
something else: on the contrary, mind is this power only by looking the 
negative in the face, and dwelling with it. This dwelling beside it is the magic 
power that converts the negative into being. That power is just what we spoke 
of above as subject, which by giving determinateness a place in its substance, 
cancels abstract immediacy, i.e. immediacy which merely is, and, by so doing, 
becomes the true substance, becomes being or immediacy that does not 
have mediation outside it, but is this mediation itself.12 
 
We can see here how the dialectic is first conceived in terms of the 
contradiction of self-consciousness, the split subject who turns to philosophy (Baillie: 
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“desires from philosophy”, Miller and Pinkard: “demands from philosophy” – the 
German is verlangt, or “requires”) not so much knowledge – which perhaps is the 
only thing philosophy can provide, but instead “the recovery through its agency of 
that lost sense of solid and substantial being.” Hegel here almost can conceive of 
substance as subject (or substance as divided, as McGowan argues Lacan, in his 
near-repetition of Hegel, conceives via the lack in the big Other)13 – “opening up the 
compact solidity of substantial existence, and bringing this to the light and level of 
self-consciousness” – but instead he argues that the self-conscious subject mistakes 
lack for loss, and asks philosophy to “[run] together what thought has divided 
asunder.” And, further, Hegel crucially argues that the desire for wholeness relies on 
clickbait: “The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, love--these are the bait required 
to awaken the desire to bite” (the bait/bite homophony works better in English than 
in German: Köder/Anbeißen). Clickbait, that is, is akin to the proximate or neighboring 
Hegelian discourses or figural subjectivities of the beautiful soul and the law of the 
heart, which dyad I return to in the penultimate section of this review. 
This clickbait then may be what is meant in the second passage, when Hegel 
unwittingly provides a title for Žižek: tarrying with the negative.14 That is, to paraphrase 
Hegel, Spirit is not the power that closes its eye to the clickbait, as when we say of 
something that it is nothing, a mere distraction, and turn away. I’m not a sucker, I 
don’t fall for that. On the contrary, Spirit is this power only by looking the clickbait in 
the face, and clicking on it. Tarrying with the negative is clicking on clickbait. The 
immediacy of resisting clickbait – being present, not being distracted – this is “the 
immediacy which barely is, and thus is authentic substance.” And we know what 
Hegel thinks of authentic substance.  
 
3. McGowan without Clickbait  
 In McGowan’s study, there are numerous pitfalls that bedevil readers of Hegel. 
This is a major conundrum for any present-day student of Hegel, from Pippin and 
Jameson and Comay to Buck-Morss and Brandom and McGowan: on the one hand, 
how to read Hegel without his various commentators but, on the other, how to 
account for their mis-readings of Hegel.15 The problem with the first strategy is the 
lure of immediacy, the fantasy that we can encounter a text “fresh”, for its own sake. 
The problem with the second strategy is stolen enjoyment. For Brandom, this 
paradox comes down at some points to a worry about how “normative attitudes are 
instituted by normative statuses [or] the idea that statuses that are to begin with 
merely virtual, as the objects of attitudes of attributing and acknowledging them, 
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become actual when those attitudes are suitably situated in such complex 
constellations.”16 Which is to say, Brandom’s reading of Hegel – really, his translation 
of Hegel into academic American philosophy qua pragmatic semantics – entails 
taking a “merely virtual” Hegel and acknowledging and attributing the superior or 
master discourses of, say, John McDowell or Wilfrid Sellars.17 Buck-Morss, asking why 
the topic of Hegel and Haiti has been neglected, charges that “Not only have Hegel 
scholars failed to answer this question; they have failed, for the past two hundred 
years, even to ask it”, adding that this is a puzzle about how the “Hegel 
establishment” has neglected Pierre-Franklin Tavarès’ exploratory work on “Hegel, 
philosophe anti-esclavagiste” as well as her own (14).  
Pippin and Jameson battle it out in their respective footnotes, with Pippin, in 
his pamphlet on chapter four of the Phenomenology, arguing against “allegorical or 
figurative interpretations in both Brandom’s and McDowell’s accounts,” after, in reply 
to Brandom’s contention that Hegel’s struggle unto death is an allegory of 
commitment, suggesting that “[b]eing willing to lose one’s job, for example, could be 
another commitment.”18 This notion of the struggle to death in the master-slave 
dialectic as flirting with unemployment brings to mind, of course, the final pages of 
Jameson’s Representing Capital, where he argues not only that Marx’s Capital is a 
book about unemployment, but that this can only be thought of via the dialectic of 
domination (in its Foucauldean or anarchistic guises) and exploitation. This last, an 
economic condition, then we will return to in our concluding remarks on the 
emancipation in McGowan’s book and its title. But Jameson also warns us, in his 
short book on Hegel, that Pippin’s own project, for all its rigorous philosophizing (or 
perhaps because of it; here we follow Jameson is seeing Theory as having 
superseded philosophy in the postmodern), is merely another “rescue operation,” 
with the object of making “Hegel respectable and allow[ing] him re-entry into the 
fraternity of professional philosophers,” a pragmatic Rortyanism, a “modest lowering 
of the volume of Hegel’s dialectical claims” that also tries to update Hegel into a 
philosopher of modernism.19 And yet, curiously, the clutter of other readings – or its 
repression – returns in Jameson’s readings of Hegel and language. Commenting on 
how, for Hegel, language means less than it says (first, in the general notion, of the 
first chapter of the Phenomenology, that “we ourselves directly refute what we mean 
to say”),20 Jameson argues that language is more correctly “an index of error or 
contradiction. Language, in other words, is more revealing for what it cannot say 
than for what it does manage to say: and this will clearly also mark the kinship of this 
moment of Hegel, not only with contemporary theory, but also with modernism in 
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literature, where failure is so often more significant than success, and where the 
limits of language become the paradigm for the limits of representation as such.”21 
For Comay, in Mourning Sickness, published contemporaneously with The Hegel 
Variations (2011 and 2010, respectively), Hegel both is and is not a modernist, to 
mimic the language of her conclusion: “Hegel does not, then, or does not only 
reproduce the standard German response to the French Revolution … the ‘revolution 
in poetic language’ that marks the seemingly one-way street from modernity to 
aesthetic modernism.”22 The marked and unmarked citations point to Kristeva and 
Benjamin, and the passage from modernity to German Idealism rehearses the 
argument with which Comay begins her study – that Hegel marks the gentrification 
of the revolution from the social to thought.  
McGowan indulges in such deck-clearing in two distinct ways: his opening 
arguments that both the defenders and attackers of Hegel have missed the point, 
and his continuing engagements throughout the text with commentators from 
Comay to Dolar, Deleuze to Pippin. Interestingly, he stresses that divergent readings 
of Hegel are not so much due to mistakes among the critics, but rather are due to 
something intrinsic to Hegel’s own writing. To understand that, we require a more 
robust theory of clickbait. And for that, we need to read McGowan (and Lacan).  
 
4. Clickbait without Hegel23 
 When I began reading McGowan’s book, I came across a passage from 
Encyclopedic Logic – the so-called “lesser Logic” – where Hegel writes that “a human 
being is nothing other than the series of his acts” (EaH 43). This formulation, 
McGowan assures us, is “not just Hegel’s critique of hypocrisy, but his recognition 
that what we do manifests our desire in a way that our thinking cannot.” Now, I have 
a student working on hypocrisy and the Victorian novel, so I cut and pasted that 
passage from the PDF of McGowan’s book and emailed it to her as a way into 
thinking about her project via psychoanalysis. As I was doing this, I noticed an email 
from the New York Review of Books about an article by Anthony Appiah on 
irrationalism, and clicked on the link. This was the Easter weekend, when the Žižek-
Peterson debate took place, and so when my browser opened, I noticed a Twitter 
feed I had open on the debate, and started checking it – there were more than 1000 
comments – and I came across a thread in response to Peterson’s having posted a 
Toronto Star article on the debate. What interested me was @leaih’s post, “News with 
no depth, I think we have all become overly used to this low level click bate [sic] 
journalism. Is there any recommended journalists that convey news articulately and 
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accurately?”24 Judging from her twitter bio and feed, @leaih is a British, pro-Trump, 
pro-Brexit, Islamaphobic fan of Jordan Peterson and Christopher Hitchens, who 
posts a great deal of so-called click bait on her twitter feed, which sounds, and is, 
tautological. 
Click bait is like how Terry Eagleton characterized ideology: your hyperlink is 
clickbait, mine is “articulately accurate.” This circular anecdote – clickbait leading me 
from McGowan’s book to, well, the disavowal of clickbait, is a way of illustrating that 
clickbait functions as the gateway to our unconscious, that we can understand it via 
Lacan’s concept of the lure, and, (this is entirely due to McGowan’s book) that we 
need to think about the digital unconscious in a dialectical fashion, to navigate 
between the Scylla of digitalphilia (it’s all great, whether online activism, millennial 
self-presentation, identitarian expression or corporate utopias and mommy blogs) 
and the Charybdis of digital phobia (which is often just millennial racism, phones are 
making us stupid, why are people texting while they drive/walk/watch movies/have 
sex). 
McGowan’s emphasis on the dialectic helps us to understand how clickbait 
works as the gate to our unconscious: when we click on a hot link, we click on our 
desire. This is clear when he writes that “the unconscious is not concerned with what 
is good but with what is satisfying. The good serves as a lure for consciousness that 
enables the unconscious to satisfy itself by undermining the subject’s conscious 
intentions,” (EaH 42) following it up with a citation from Lacan’s Seminar VII: “There is 
no other good than that which may serve to pay the price for access to desire”, 
McGowan adding that “the only role of the good is to be sacrificed for the sake of our 
unconscious desire.”25 Now, one of the primary ways in which we think about the 
internet, or clickbait, is as a kind of plague of distractions, what which pulls us away 
from our concentration (whether this last is thought of in terms of academic work or 
middlebrow mindfulness, watching the kids, or driving, reading Hegel or enjoying 
nature). Just to flesh out distraction vs immersion or concentration, we can usefully 
recall Walter Benjamin’s exhortation that architecture is best appreciated in a state of 
distraction, his class-critique of concentration as a bourgeois fetish (distraction is for 
the masses, he wrote).  But if we think about it, surely the good of immersion or 
concentration simply exists for its contradiction, for the unconscious desire qua 
distraction.  
And we can see the contradiction at work here if we think of an episode of the 
television show Brooklyn Nine-Nine (late in the second season), where one of the 
characters, Gina, is deep into her phone & everyone is trying to distract her, blowing 
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an airhorn by her head, playing dance music, etc. Then, one character, Terry, 
succeeds: Gina suddenly looks up and calls his name. How did he distract her from 
her phone, you ask? His method is devilishly clever: he changes his Facebook 
relationship status to "it's complicated."26 Terry is supposed to be a happily married 
man – one of the counter-intuitive (which means, on television, counter-stereotype) 
things is that he is a very well-built black man who is “dulling and uxorious”, as Ezra 
Pound wrote, who “loves love,” who is always going on about his twin daughters 
Cagney and Lacey.27 So changing his relationship status to “it’s complicated” tells his 
social media friends that something is up,  – in the digital vernacular, “it’s 
complicated” takes what you would say to a friend IRL (in real life) when they ask you 
how your love life or dating life is, something you would say as a kind of euphemism 
or disavowal of a disaster etc., and transforms it (transforms the phrase “it’s 
complicated”) into a master signifier. This is no doubt very obvious to many of my 
readers but I just want to work through the logic of the situation on the television 
show: that is, you distract someone from their phone (the instrument of the “plague of 
distractions”) via the phone, via the immanent contradictions in the phone--such 
signals as a friend’s relationship status changing “grab us by our lack” and makes us 
engage IRL. Clickbait functions in the same way: qua distraction, qua our desire. To 
digitize Lacan, the only role of the good, of our concentration, is to be sacrificed for 
the sake of desire, for clickbait qua distraction.  
To further develop this argument, I want to return to McGowan’s claim that “the 
unconscious is not concerned with what is good but with what is satisfying. The 
good serves as a lure for consciousness that enables the unconscious to satisfy itself 
by undermining the subject’s conscious intentions,” (EaH 42). I am interested in the 
concept of the “lure” here. McGowan is drawing on Lacan’s summing up towards the 
end of Seminar VII (in the final lesson, titled by Miller as “The Paradoxes of Ethics, or 
Have You Acted in Conformity with your Desire?”), where he says “There is no other 
good than that which may serve to pay the price for access to desire – given that 
desire is understood here, as we have defined it elsewhere, as the metonymy of our 
being”, and continuing with the assertion that this desire has to do with “what we are 
as well as what we are not” and “that which is signified in an act passes from one 
signifier of the chain to another beneath all the significations”.28 I’ll come back to this 
“what we are as well as what we are not” shortly. 
Of course, throughout his work Lacan relies on metaphors as well as actual 
references to cybernetic and other features of what we would now call universal 
telecomputation – Vorstellungsrepräsentanzen as signifying network, the antinomies 
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of searching and finding and the lost object & das Ding, or (still restricting ourselves 
to Seminar VII), “Never act except in such a way that your action may be 
programmed”, the last perhaps expressing “in the language of electronics and 
automation” what is undoubtedly the key Lacanian meme of the seminar, “do not 
give up on your desire” (ne pas céder sur son désir).29 I argue that Lacan’s concept of 
the lure, especially, can help us to understand the contemporary digital practice of 
clickbait in its full dialectical splendor. For clickbait works simultaneously at the 
register of the oral (it is bait, also known as thirst traps), at the visual (we see it), and 
at the haptic (we click).  And the lure (or leurre: lure, decoy, bait, allurement or 
enticement30 is a concept Lacan turns to again and again in Seminars VII and XI 
especially, arguing that the lure functions as a structure, an imaginary capture, 
telegraphed most succinctly with the famous example of the painters Zeuxis and 
Parrhasius. Just to recap this episode, which is as important to my theory here as 
Brooklyn Nine-Nine and Facebook status updates, we all remember the contest 
between the two painters, where each is to render the more life-like painting. Pliny 
the Elder tells us, in Natural History, that Zeuxis paints a bunch of grapes, which are 
so realistic that a bird flies at them and tries to eat them. A lure indeed!  Parrhasius, 
when it is time to display his work, has a curtain drawn across a wall. Zeuxis asks for 
the veil to be drawn back, and of course the curtain or veil is itself the painting: where 
Zeuxis tricked a bird, Parrhasius has tricked an artist, or rather, tricks his eye (true 
power, to cite another text by McGowan, lies with the veiled phallus31). If painting, as 
Lacan says elsewhere in Seminar XI, entails laying down the gaze, then clickbait 
grabs us by the lack in our gaze, a gaze which has no power, or, rather, a clickbait 
that triumphs over the eye. Like the lure, like Parrhasius’ painting, clickbait makes us 
think there is something beyond the link.  
And so, if clickbait seems to be a matter of the obscene underside of digital 
(like trolling, dick pics, sexting), this is to mistake where the obscenity lies: not in the 
content (clickbait or Reddit) but in the form – our split as manifested in signifiers. For 
clickbait, we are told, is the mechanism by which social media restricts us to our 
echo chamber. Clickbait, we are told, is the method whereby Russian malfeasance 
threatens American democracy. Clickbait, we are told, is the millennial media tool par 
excellence, responsible for listicles, trending vapidity, and the plague of distractions. 
As my Facebook and Jordan Peterson examples make clear, I trust, I am interested 
in thinking about clickbait not simply as a synonym for banal online journalism but in 
its broadest sense; too, as I have read Lacan via McGowan, I want to think about a 
dialectical reading of clickbait via McGowan and Hegel (but also Lacan). As I quoted 
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earlier, in Seminar VII, Lacan declares that desire has to do with “what we are as well 
as what we are not,” recalling McGowan’s anti-identitarian reading of Hegel, where 
“being itself is contradictory,” citing the Science of Logic, “Such talk of identity … 
contradicts itself”, going on to add that “Identity depends on what negates it” and that 
“Hegel’s challenge to the law of identity is inseparable from his questioning of the 
principle of noncontradiction” (EaH 6,7). If we agree with Hegel and McGowan, then 
we can ask: does clickbait contradict itself? Or, even more scandalously, does 
McGowan’s text? I think the answer to the first question is yes, because clickbait 
reveals our unconscious. Where is McGowan’s unconscious? 
 
5. Hegel without the Hegelians 
As I noted before my excursus on clickbait, McGowan discusses the readings 
from which he seeks to distinguish his interpretation in two fashions: he begins with 
a gesture of deck-clearing that cunningly situates the mis-readings of Hegel in the 
narrative of McGowan’s discovery of contradiction. Hegel has suffered, he remarks, a 
“posthumous catastrophe” (the title of the first section of McGowan’s preface) with, 
first, the split of Hegelians into Left and Right – a well-trodden path, to be sure, but 
with McGowan’s innovation that the left’s appropriation of Hegel’s dialectics and 
historical consciousness has turned out to be a dead end. Lukács and Sartre are 
irrelevant, consigned to the library stacks of academic Marxism, and “[e]ven Adorno’s 
critical theory appears outdated in an epoch that no longer has a place for his form 
of theoretical resistance to the hegemony of the popular” (EaH 2). As if to drive this 
point home, McGowan then offers an analogy from Star Trek by way of arguing that 
the most unfashionable elements of Hegel (his theories of Christianity and the state 
which, jettisoned by Marx, have become such important topoi for Badiou and Žižek) 
are crucial to Hegel’s relevance today: 
Hegel’s posthumous situation parallels that of Captain Kirk (William Shatner) in 
an episode of the original Star Trek television series entitled “The Enemy 
Within.” In this episode, a malfunction with the device that teleports Kirk back 
from a planet to the starship causes him to split into two separate beings – one 
embodying his kindness, generosity, and sense of justice, the other embodying 
his aggression, cruelty, and lust. The incident occurs unbeknownst to the other 
members of the crew and even to Kirk himself. Each version of him 
experiences himself as Kirk, just as both Left and Right Hegelianism 
experience themselves as the real Hegelianism. When the split becomes 
evident, the members of the crew treat the gentle Kirk as the authentic version 
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and the violent one as a counterfeit. But it soon becomes clear that Kirk cannot 
function as the captain of the ship without this capacity for violence. The most 
unappealing traits are precisely those that render him an effective starship 
captain. (EaH 3) 
Two Kirks: soon enough we will have two Hegels, and other splittings of the subject. 
Evidently this excursus on Star Trek is as much a demonstration of the outdatedness 
of Adorno’s mandarin disdain for popular culture (although, as I argue elsewhere, we 
need to view such disdain dialectically, along with the unreflective valorization of the 
popular – and that this contradiction should not be reconciled) as it is a set-up for 
one of McGowan’s most important arguments early in his book: that Hegel’s theories 
of the state and Christianity are “the linchpin” for his (or at least McGowan’s) theory of 
emancipation. But this staging of left versus right Hegel is also the terrain on which 
McGowan begins to work out his other key tenet: the question of contradiction, and 
its relation to the split subject. McGowan reads Hegel as a Lacanian avant la lettre: 
rescuing both Christianity, as a doctrine of the “divine as a divided subject” (EaH 3) 
and the state, as that which is necessary “to rip subjects out of their attachment to 
the illusions of their private world” (EaH 5).  
McGowan will nonetheless return again and again to do battle with other 
interpreters. Thus Hegel’s politics occur the morning after, and yet their immanent 
contradiction portends a more radical politics than the “rightist deviations” of Marx, 
who made the mistake of trying to change the world, rather than interpret it. 
“Emancipation,” McGowan writes, “involves making explicit and embracing 
contradiction, whereas conservatism aims at repressing or eliminating it” (EaH 213). 
The problem – but also the great insight – of such analysis is that it holds the left’s 
feet to the fire. Or consider McGowan’s comments on Gillian Rose, which punctuate 
his tenth chapter, on “Emancipation without Solutions.” Here McGowan confronts the 
dilemma that the later Hegel seems to have betrayed his youthful support for the 
French Revolution, because, as he declared in the History of Philosophy, “The 
ultimate aim and interest of philosophy is to reconcile thought or the concept with 
actuality.” For McGowan, Rose’s mistake is to not give up on the contradiction 
between the actual and the theoretical; for Hegel, the Absolute turns out to be an 
absolute contradiction, a mess, a total failure. Rose wants to set the world straight –
the fantasy of left and right – and Hegel, or McGowan, are happy to let it be an 
#epicfail. And this contradiction between the youthful, revolutionary Hegel and the 
state-loving elder is another contradiction that has to be preserved: it has to be 
preserved not by sp(l)itting (on) Hegel, but by comparing Hegel to the Beatles.32 
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6. What if Hegel never existed? 
Here we might ask if the young Hegel would have been a Young Hegelian (that is, a 
left Hegelian). McGowan’s discussion of Hegel and love (which I turn to later in this 
review) suggests as much, as does, of course, the young Hegel’s biography of that 
period--not only his chafing against the servitude of being a private tutor or 
Hofmeister in Berne and Frankfurt, and his enthusiasm for the French Revolution (for 
all of which, see Pinkard’s biography), but also his early writings. Consider the 
translation (from the French) of an anti-aristocratic pamphlet by Jean-Jacques Cart 
(Hegel was at that time a Hofmeister for the Berne notable Captain von Steiger), in 
the commentary for which Hegel argued that tax relief for the people of the Vaud (the 
French-speaking oppressed peasants in and around Berne), in compensation for 
loss of freedom, was too little and too inadequate; Hegel inveighed against those for 
whom “it is still very generally believed that enjoying no civil rights at all counts for 
much less than having a few less Thalers yearly in one’s wallet,”33 which analysis is no 
doubt pertinent in today’s discussions (of reparations for slavery in the U.S., or 
compensation for residential school victims in Canada: see the final section of this 
essay for the latter).  
Too, with respect to the theme of reconciliation, so vexed in any reading of 
Hegel and central to McGowan’s conception of contradiction (spoiler alert: for 
McGowan, Hegel’s reconciliation, or Versöhnung, involves being reconciled to 
contradiction, to the irreconcilable), this is first broached, Lukács argues, in Hegel’s 
Berne-period manuscript “The Positivity of Christian Religion.”34 Hegel’s critique of 
religion and reconciliation is almost Nietzschean in its sarcastic takedown of the 
success of early Christianity in the Roman Empire:  
A people … must welcome a religion which exalts the dominant spirit of the 
age, its moral impotence, the dishonour it endures through being trodden 
underfoot; such a religion is sanctified in the name of ‘passive obedience’ 
which makes it appear as honour and the loftiest virtue, an operation by 
means of which men might gaze in wonder and pleasure at the transformation 
of the contempt of others and their own sense of disgrace into pride and 
peace of mind.35 
Of course, since this text was not published during Hegel’s, or indeed Nietzsche’s, 
lifetime (it first appeared in Herman Nohl’s edition of Hegels theologische 
Jugendschriften in 1907), it can hardly be said to have influenced Nietzsche, but that 
thought experiment, like the one that opens this section (was the young Hegel a 
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Young Hegelian?) is very much to McGowan’s taste, I would think, since one of his 
most powerful readerly moments in Emancipation after Hegel comes in the chapter 
“Hegel after Freud.” There he argues that the vocabulary and concepts of German 
Idealism (Kant, Schelling, Hölderlin, Fichte) are not sufficient to Hegel’s reason, 
resulting in a “torsion” in his language.36 This follows yet more brush-clearing by 
McGowan, who opens the chapter by arguing that Hegel is the most misunderstood 
of modern philosophers (it is as if Marx were read as an apologist for capitalism, or 
Nietzsche for Christianity, he remarks), so much so that even his defenders disagree, 
and even more so than they do from his attackers (Pippin’s Hegel is more different 
from Comay’s, to be sure, than either are from Deleuze’s). 
But if we can think of a “Hegel after Freud” – that is, find a proto-notion of the 
unconscious in the subject qua contradiction, as McGowan argues – which is to say, 
to read Hegel as if Freud existed, can we think of a Hegel without Hegel? This is the 
argument – not with respect to Hegel, but the Beatles – of the recent film Yesterday 
(Danny Boyle, 2019). In this film, what Badiou calls an Event has taken place – an 
Event of subtraction: a 12 second global electrical brown-out has left everyone on the 
planet, with one exception, unaware that the Beatles ever existed. Our hero, Jack 
Malik, does remember the songs, however, and thus singularly – a mistake that is 
beholden to the mythology of Romantic genius – he becomes the messiah of pop 
music, the greatest musician of all time, or, as the kids say today, GOAT. “Messiah,” 
as Emmanuel Carrère reminded us in Kingdom, means the anointed one, and Jack 
has indeed been anointed by the historical forgetting of the Beatles. The 
contradiction, to bring us back to McGowan and Hegel, is this: the Beatles can only 
be great in a world in which the Beatles do not exist.37 Or, rather, their songs only 
sound so good if we haven’t heard them a million zillion times (as a character says 
about pop music in Reservoir Dogs). Who can hear Here Comes the Sun or Help! or I 
Wanna Hold Your Hand or Eleanor Rigby without groaning?  
 The film therefore calls for an argument for and against a historicism of the 
Beatles. We can see how the film confirms my thesis that “historicism is an academic 
Thing which unwittingly reveals or revels in the irruption of the Real via the 
contingent.”38 On the one hand, the film is ludicrous, Adornoan critics argue, because 
the Beatles aren’t universally great; but then, the McGowanite fans argue back, the 
Beatles are great not because of context, but rather because of how they have 
affected history: “[a] masterpiece is not a work of art which transcends its time but 
one that changes the symbolic coordinates of its time.”39 Finally, that very historicism 
is undone by its own premise – that the Beatles had to exist in order for us to now 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 






think they were great; like Hegel, they always out of synch (Comay) arriving too early 
(as McGowan argues Hegel’s philosophy did vis-à-vis Freud) and too late to do 
anything concrete (the Owl of Minerva, and so on). 
Finally, and this is crucial to the film, it mixes up early and late Beatles, the 
simple pop songs with the more trippy hippie period – as if one were to perform a 
short circuit on Marx or Freud and go directly from the Paris Manuscripts to Capital, 
to fuse the Entwurf with Moses and Monotheism. In the same regard, I argue, not 
only is McGowan’s reading of Hegel only possible in a post-Freudian, post-Lacanian 
critical context, Hegel is only possible because of psychoanalysis.  
 
 7. This is the thanks I get for writing this review? McGowan without Burnham 
McGowan finds in Hegel’s early writings on love an ethic that may be both 
Badiouan and Lacanian: love scales reconciliation “down” from the social to the 
couple-form (but also scales “up” from thought); further, the thinking of love enables, 
McGowan argues, Hegel to make his break with Kant and Fichte (but also, surely, 
Schelling?) via the “contradictory identity” of identity and difference, where that last is 
not thought of in today’s Deleuzean multicultural doxa , for “Love … enables the 
subject to translate difference--the difference between the lover and the beloved--
into contradiction” (EaH, 99).  McGowan expands on this relation between love and 
contradiction with the chapter’s bravura reading of Casablanca: 
 
Rick falls in love without regard for his own interest. The contradiction of love 
destroys the stability of Rick’s life. But this contradiction also animates Rick’s 
subjectivity by giving his life a value it otherwise wouldn’t have. The disruption 
that love causes derives directly from its contradictory status. Love forces the 
subject to recognize that it is not a self-identical being but a being whose 
identity is out there in the other. (EaH 112).  
 
But to truly understand McGowan’s argument here with respect to love and 
contradiction, we have to backtrack, on the one hand, to Hegel’s break with Kantian 
notions of duty and then leap forward to The Sopranos. This means thinking duty 
along with love, but also that the key to understanding The Sopranos lies not in the 
action but what they are watching – in what is distracting the characters and the 
viewers (and the characters as viewers). So too Hegel is not self-identical but “out 
there” – in clickbait. 
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There is a paper to be written on the role of television-watching in The 
Sopranos: the History channel versions of World War II that Tony eats ice cream in 
front of, the girls watching a film in Tony’s man-cave when he and Carmela have 
separated, and of course the references to The Godfather. The intermedial status of 
the television set or big screen frames an intertextual reference for the narrative, akin 
to an aside or quotation; or they may function as historical reference, as Toscano and 
Kinkle argue for the financial crisis qua TV news coverage in bar scenes in Killing 
Them Softly.40 In a Christmas scene in season 6 of The Sopranos, we see a brief clip 
from Alasdair Sims in Scrooge, then, after a few channel switches, Casablanca plays 
in the background for a few clips: a fight scene between a German and a French 
soldier, Rick telling them “you better leave off politics or get out,” refugees’ repeated 
toasts “to America,” and a German officer saying “in Casablanca, life is cheap.”41 
Reading The Sopranos avec McGowan entails turning, then, to how McGowan 
contrasts Hegel’s theory of love with Kant’s philosophy of duty. 
In McGowan’s reading of Kant, the conception of duty and moral law is a 
breakthrough for Hegel and Fichte: “When Kant deduces ‘can’ from ‘must,’ he shows 
that the bare existence of the moral law – in whatever form we articulate it--testifies 
to our freedom… Our ability to formulate the moral law proves we are free” (EaH 110). 
But this moral law, McGowan argues, disallows any externality or otherness: morality 
is “inner,” like a vulgar Freudian notion of the unconscious; for Hegel, “Through love, 
the world ceases to be an externality on which the subject acts.”  
How does this work for The Sopranos? Here we can venture a semiotic 
rectangle of love and duty. 
Figure 1:  
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The Sopranos – especially in this episode, where Christopher anguishes over 
whether or not to tell Tony that he is seeing Juliana, a woman Tony tried to date –
often thematizes or emplots conflicts of love and duty. The citation of Casablanca 
foregrounds this concern even more so. Love and duty are in some way oppositional, 
antinomic, or a dialectical non-relation. The very difficulty Tony has throughout the 
series with being faithful to Carmela is evidence of this; even more so, is his 
complaining to Dr. Melfi that “the thanks he gets” for doing precisely that (being 
faithful) when tempted by Juliana is to have to witness Juliana’s liaison with 
Christopher. His would-be protégé is stealing his enjoyment, even as Christopher’s 
infidelity (Juliana is his goomah in the Sopranos’ vernacular – he also has a pregnant 
wife) is so sanctioned by the mobsters that they wonder why he hasn’t brought her 
around. Christopher’s affair is a double dereliction of duty: both from that of the 
couple-form and the mob (the latter doubles down: as the footnote to the episode 
wiki-page explains, Christopher at first tells Tony he’s not bringing his new girlfriend 
around because she is black – this imaginary girl’s name adorns the episode – and of 
course the real reason is because she, Juliana, was once the object of Tony’s 
affections). Just as the opposite of duty is slacking off, the opposite of love is hate 
(although some might argue indifference), and so a dutiful hate is a mob-sanctioned 
hit, or murder. But even for Kant, duty is less something you hide behind like the 
archetypal Nazi, Eichmann;42 The Sopranos manage the impossible task of 
reconciling Kant and Hegel. A dutiful marriage is never quite satisfying (“this is the 
thanks I get?”), and so too a dutiful hit (the more exciting murders in the series are 
either unexpected – as when Tony finds an ex-mobster in witness protection in the 
first season – or verboten, as with the murder of Fat Dom, a made guy from another 
crew in the final season). A dutiful hit is never really enjoyed. Finally, the dystopian 
bottom of the rectangle: slacking off avec hate: this is watching TV. In this episode in 
particular, we view one of the unacknowledged uses of television viewership: 
Bobby’s children are not really watching TV to enjoy it, they look more begrudging. 
Watching TV is a chore, but at least it isn’t as bad as helping to set the table or any of 
the other myriad micro-deeds the American family inflicts on its children. 
 
8. Beautiful soul and law of the heart: or, what is Pippin doing in here? 
Here a brief side note from Robert Pippin’s review of Žižek’s Less than Nothing 
may be germane: “… the first sentence of Žižek’s conclusion [“The Political 
Suspension of the Ethical”] – ‘What the inexistence of the big Other signals is that 
every ethical and/or moral edifice has to be grounded on an abyssal act which is, in 
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the most radical sense imaginable, political’,” Pippin writes,  “makes zero Hegelian 
sense. Something understood by an agent as an ‘abyssal’ act is a delusion, the 
pathos of self-inflating and posed heroism, and the gesture belongs in the Hegelian 
zoo along with The Beautiful Soul, The Knight of Virtue and especially The Frenzy of 
Self-Conceit.43 In a Lacanian sense (or a Lacanian misreading of Hegel), Pippin here 
repeats (although – or because – he has already admitted that Lacan is “above his 
pay grade”) Lacan’s misreading of Hegel’s distinction between the beautiful soul and 
the law of the heart. In “The Freudian Thing,” Lacan argues that the former “is said to 
live … precisely off the order it denounces” and goes on to speak of “the delusion of 
presumption to which Hegel applied it, remaining caught in the trap offered by the 
mirage of consciousness to the I infatuated with its own feeling, which Hegel turns 
into the law of the heart.”44 That is, as Žižek argues in Tarrying with the Negative, 
Lacan errs “by condensing two different ‘figures of consciousness.”45 More pertinent 
to Pippin’s dismissal of the Žižekian act as a “delusion,” a gesture that belongs in the 
Hegelian zoo along with the Beautiful Soul and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit (or Law of 
the Heart) is how he repeats Lacan’s condensation. Pippin’s is a weak repetition, one 
might argue, for he does not so much confuse the two as merely list them (along 
with the Knight of Virtue), but his diagnosis of Žižek’s delusion suggests we can 
follow up on the Lacanian taxonomy of the hysteric versus the psychotic that Žižek 
suggests applies to the beautiful soul and the law of the heart, respectively. That is, if 
we think delusion as a symptom of the psychotic, then this seems to appertain to 
how Hegel describes self-conceit: where reality is therefore “a law by which the 
particular individuality is oppressed, a violent ordering of the world which contradicts 
the law of the heart.”46 Or, as Žižek puts it, “ ‘The Law of the Heart and the Frenzy of 
Self-Conceit’ … clearly refers to a psychotic attitude – to a self-proclaimed Savior who 
imagines his inner Law to be the Law of everybody and is therefore compelled, in 
order to explain why the ‘world’ (his social environs) does not follow his precepts, to 
resort to paranoiac constructions.”47 
Here two comments seem to be pertinent: first that the Law of the Heart would 
seem to apply quite well to such figures as Trump-bemoaning Republicans, for 
whom Trump has perverted the dignity of the office and the G.O.P. and to legacy 
press figures and media scholars who wave their fingers at clickbait for its propensity 
to distract readers from meaningful journalism. Second, contra Žižek (and McGowan, 
whose digital breadcrumbs to “The Freudian Thing” and Tarrying with the Negative I 
gleaned from his and Engley’s podcast), perhaps Lacan’s and Pippin’s respective 
condensations of the Beautiful Soul and the Law of the Heart are symptomatic? Not, 
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rest assured, that I am arguing the concepts are self-identical, but rather that their 
very propensity to be confused suggests “the desire called reconciliation” that haunts 
post-Hegelian theory. Just as we can only have a sans after an avec, so too we can 
only have a (con)fusing of two Hegelian concepts if we also have a splitting of Hegel. 
 
9. Reconciliation without contradiction: the crude intrusion of the political 
This leads to a final theme in my reading of McGowan’s book: how he opens up 
the concept of reconciliation. We can think of this – we can tarry with reconciliation –
in terms of, first, how Hegel thinks of theory, or philosophy, as necessarily following 
the political act (which may be the abyssal that so frightens Pippin); as he puts it in 
the second lengthy quote from the beginning of this essay:  
 
the life of mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of destruction; it 
endures death and in death maintains its being. It only wins to its truth when it 
finds itself utterly torn asunder. It is this mighty power, not by being a positive 
which turns away from the negative, as when we say of anything it is nothing 
or it is false, and, being then done with it, pass off to something else: on the 
contrary, mind is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and 
dwelling with it.48 
 
That is, the mind “utterly torn asunder” is the split subject qua consciousness 
(“what thought has put asunder” in the earlier quotation which Hegel has warned us 
cannot be reconciled.49 Now, this split subject, which McGowan argues Lacan 
inherits from Hegel, also has its colonial or even Indigenous origins. But to 
understand these origins, and their role in Lacan (and our reading of Hegel), we have 
to briefly dwell on problems with McGowan’s theory of contradiction. 
If, as Engley and McGowan opine somewhere, it is the very restrictions that 
allow for freedom in Hegel, we can perhaps say the same thing with respect to a 
failing that McGowan criticizes Hegel for, and which turns up in McGowan’s own 
theory: a propensity of overly Just so logic, airtight arguments: “If we look at the case 
of cloning, this becomes clear,” (EaH 100) or, when discussing Hegel and Freud: “It is 
impossible for the subject endowed with an unconscious to live in harmony with 
itself. This impossibility parallels exactly Hegel’s recognition of the inevitability of 
contradiction” (EaH 42). There are two problems with these features of McGowan’s 
text (and with my reading of them). First, is the problem of reifying contradiction.50 For 
contradiction functions in Emancipation after Hegel rather like original sin (or 
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enjoyment for Lacanians): “As Hegel sees it, to refuse to accept that contradiction is 
not only thinkable but also possible would leave us unable to account for the act of 
thinking itself, which requires the involvement of non-identity within every assertion of 
identity” (EaH 9). Contradiction does not lack, it is absolute substance. But while this 
may be the enunciated statement of McGowan’s theory, his enunciation of that 
theory – which is to say, his development of that, turns out to be anything but reified. 
We can see this by returning to the colonial notion of the split subject. My method 
here is guided by Buck-Morss (but also Comay): first, by Buck-Morss’ argument that 
Hegel’s concept of the master-slave dialectic owes at least some of its origins to the 
Haitian revolution, and second, to both Buck-Morss and Comay’s methods, which 
are to consider philosophy in a broader discursive and social context.  
One of the primary forms of contradiction in McGowan’s reading of Hegel is 
the notion of the divided or split subject: not only is the subject divided against itself, 
but so too substance, or God, the absolute. This notion of the split subject is of 
course pre-eminently Freudian, or Lacanian: we have an unconscious, are castrated 
by language. And while McGowan warns against a direct genealogy from Hegel, via 
Kojève, to Lacan (he sees Kojève’s effects as deleterious to the message of Hegel), it 
is not difficult to see a connection between the master-slave dialectic and the split 
subject, except that for readers of Lacan today, it is not so much imaginary 
recognition, or the mirror stage, that compels us, as the real of castration.  
I want to suggest, or to make the beginning, of offering another genealogy of 
Lacan’s split subject, one very much in the spirit of Buck-Morss’ reading of Hegel, and 
this is by looking at two specific moments in the Écrits, from the 1960 talk “Remarks 
on Daniel Lagache’s Presentation” and the 1958 review “The Youth of Gide, or the 
Letter and Desire.” The question I am asking here, then, is in what way does Lacan’s 
“split subject,” for instance, extract specifically from Claude Lévi-Strauss’s misreading 
of Northwest Coast (Kwakwa�ka�ʼwakw, or Kwakiutl) transformer masks, and 
generally from his anthropological universalist approach to form. In “Remarks,” Lacan 
describes how a “figure joins together two profiles whose unity is tenable only if the 
mask remains closed”51 and in “Youth,” after referring to Freud on the “Splatung or 
splitting of the ego,” he asks “Must I …show them how to handle a mask that 
unmasks the face it represents only by splitting in two?”52 Footnotes to these 
passages, both from Lacan (for “Youth”) and Bruce Fink (for his translation of 
“Remarks”), direct the reader to two texts by Lévi-Strauss: his 1943 essay on “The Art 
of the Northwest Coast,” and the essay “Split Representation in the Art of Asia and 
America,” which first appeared in book form in 1958.53 Reading Lacan avec Lévi-
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Strauss, then, allows us to trace a genealogy of the split subject, from mask to 
anthropologist to psychoanalyst – but to what end? In what way can or should we 
read the theory of the split subject – which evidently owes  much, on the one hand, to 
a structuralist theory of the sign, and the barre between signifier and signified, and, 
on the other, to Freud’s Splatung and to Lacan’s heterodox splitting of the Ideal-Ego 
and Ego-Ideal--as originating in mask making or colonial anthropology? Am I 
arguing that Lacan has colonized Indigenous artefacts for his European theory? Or 
does this reading demonstrate how Kwakiutl art works turn out to anticipate a key 
tenet of structuralism? Or, finally, does my method here – tracing influence via Lacan 
and Lévi-Strauss’s texts – argue for a textual decolonization of psychoanalysis?  
My deliberations here will not, I hope, be taken for equivocations. First, I think 
that they are very much in the spirit of the contradictory ways in which Buck-Morss’ 
work can be read, signaled by the book’s blurbs. In one, Walter Mignolo argues that 
“Buck-Morss shows us that Hegel’s spirit is tainted with the blood and suffering of 
enslaved Africans in the European colonies”; in another, Timothy Brennan writes that 
“Buck-Morss proves … that the young Hegel wrote The Phenomenology in a 
passionate defence of freedom.” Like the split between the critics and fans of 
Yesterday, this (properly decolonial) split should be maintained, or reconciled to its 
contradiction. 
This is because my suggestion for an “indigenization” of the split subject is also 
a way into thinking of the strongest form of McGowan’s theorizing of contradiction: 
how he rescues “reconciliation” from the waste basket of liberalism. Reconciliation is 
throughout Emancipation after Hegel, indeed, it plays a starring role in the final 
paragraph to the conclusion. Reconciliation is not, however, reconciliation with the 
actual, as Lukács would have it, nor a philosophical quietism. Rather, it is a raising of 
the level of contradiction from the actual to the contradiction with the actual: it is this 
contradiction itself that reconciliation is reconciled to, or, to put it more bluntly, to the 
irreconcilable. Reconciliation, in McGowan’s reading of Hegel (and one to be found, 
as he acknowledges, in the Slovenian school – Žižek and Dolar – but also, I wager, in 
the Adorno of the Negative Dialectics), entails “the recognition that contradiction is 
not a problem to be eliminated but the driving force of all movement in being” (EaH 
14), which moves towards a unity that rather than eliminating contradiction, accepts 
it; reconciliation, finally, is the way in which “thought adopts a relationship to 
contradiction that being cannot attain. It doesn’t overcome contradiction but grasps 
its necessity” (EaH 97). 
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This is not only a concept of reconciliation quite different from the standard 
branding of Hegel as an ultimately conservative thinker (from which misreading 
Lukàcs tries to rescue him, half-heartedly) but also from the positive and negative 
reputations of reconciliation today in the era of transitional justice. Since Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu helped bring about the Truth and Reconciliation hearings in post-
Apartheid South Africa, “reconciliation” has come to do some heavy lifting in terms of 
post-conflict morality and politics: to reconcile white racists with the ANC, or former 
victims of the “Dirty War” in Argentina with the junta, or Indigenous peoples in 
Canada with the 150-year legacy of residential schools and cultural genocide.54 In 
these discourses, and specifically in the settler-colonial context of Canada, 
“reconciliation” does too little and too much. On the one hand, it becomes a band-aid 
signifier for all matters of government handwaving and milque-toast policies – the 
politics of recognition, essentially, as pointed out by the Dene theorist Glen Coulthard 
in his rewriting of Fanon, Red Skin, White Masks.55 This is reconciliation in its bad 
sense: a happy-ever-after resolution. Closure. On the other hand, the term carries too 
much expectation, especially from Indigenous people, and grass-roots activists, who 
use it to push government or corporate entities for real, structural, and significant 
change. This is arguably a strategic use of the term, and it is proximate to how 
McGowan reads Hegel. Reconciliation, then, functions as a master signifier that, 
precisely because it has such a plethora of meanings and uses, deserves to be 
preserved in our political and philosophical vocabularies.  
To turn, in conclusion, then, to what has been my method throughout this 
review. McGowan argues: “Our conscious striving for the good hides our satisfaction 
in its sacrifice” (EaH, 229n). Here, then, I have sacrificed the good of a “proper” review 
of McGowan’s book (a dutiful recounting of the main philosophical or political 
arguments, perhaps situating it in Hegel scholarship, or McGowan’s own oeuvre) for 
a plague of distractions, beginning with the discussion of Buck-Morss as a way of 
asking if we can read Hegel without a Lacanian framework. Obviously, for a straight 
philosopher like Pippin or Brandom, a psychoanalytic framework is only so much 
distraction (I am over-stating the case, since Pippin argues that part of the reason 
Hegel is neglected by academic philosophers in the Anglo-American world is that he 
brings in too much history.) In my reading, in this review, Lacan is clickbait that 
distracts us from Hegel. Or the other way around: Hegel is what makes it necessary 
to think of clickbait. Or finally: Hegel avec Lacan = clickbait. 
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By “clickbait,” here, of course I want to make a “leftist plea for distracted 
reading,” for a reading plagued by clickbait, for a reading that needs Lacan, but also 
Star Trek and Casablanca, Brooklyn Nine-Nine and Zeuxis, The Sopranos and 
Yesterday, and finally, clickbait qua method of a social distribution of influence and 
context. This is the method seen, crucially, for Buck-Morss, in the radical newspaper 
Minerva, which reported on both the French Revolution and the Haitian struggles; 
and, for Comay, in a print culture reading of German reception of the French 
Revolution, where “cultural critics across the political spectrum” sounding like today’s 
critics worried about social media, lamented a “reading disease,” the spectre of 
Zeitungsfeber, or “newspaper fever,” and “the swirl of quickly consumable books and 
periodicals, whose availability gave everyone an air of easy expertise.”56  
But to continue around the rectangle: Hegel without an unconscious is the 
Hegel that is a target for his attackers (Lyotard) and his defenders (Gillian Rose): an 
Absolute Spirit that is neither divided nor contradictory. Lacan without contradiction 
is the Imaginary, the Lacan of the mirror stage. And, then, and really this is the bottom 
of the diagram because I still don’t know what to do with it, if we don’t have an 
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unconscious or contradiction, this is McGowan’s caricature of Marxism, a politics that 
is overly invested, he argues, in success, in a resolution of contradictions rather than 
their pursuance.57 
I’m not happy to leave McGowan with the moral high ground here, so I would 




The purpose of this final semiotic rectangle avec les formules de sexuation is 
threefold: to sneak Marxism back into the emancipatory project, to loiter with the 
proposition that women are not a divided subject (viz. Hegel on Antigone), and to 
reassert the priority of clickbait qua algorithmic interpretation. There are evidently 
three components to this graphic: the semiotic rectangle proper, which itself fuses 
the Sopranos discussion with the Hegel and Lacan; the combinatorial logic of the 
upper half of the formula of sexuation (as in my use of the same mash-up in my 
essay on Žižek and Jameson, the phallic function [Φ] is akin to the split subject [$] 
qua economic castration: because Marxism); and the lower half of the formula of 
sexuation (in which, instead of La, or La femme n’existe pas, we have Le, or the big 
Other doesn’t exist). 
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